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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 On July 26, 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA) to address the various forms of discrimination against 
approximately forty-three million disabled Americans1 in critical ar-
eas such as employment.2 Prior to the ADA’s enactment, individuals 
who experienced discrimination on the basis of their disability often 
did not have legal recourse to redress such discrimination.3  
 The purposes of the ADA are clear: “to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities”4 and “to provide clear, strong, 
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”5 A federal circuit split, however, has 
significantly hindered the realization of Congress’s desire to have 
clear and consistent enforcement standards under the ADA, particu-
larly in the area of private employment.6 Under the language of the 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Florida State University College of Law; B.B.A., Man-
agement and Marketing, Emory University. I would like to thank my family for all of their 
support, Mr. Dubose Ausley for his generous scholarship, and Professor Greg Mitchell for 
his helpful comments. Special thanks to Shane Ramsey and the Law Review for all of their 
editing work. All errors in this Comment are my own.  
 1. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, nearly fifty-three million Americans, in-
cluding people of all ages, have a disability. Almost two-thirds of these individuals have a 
severe disability. JACK MCNEIL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES, 
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P70-73, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 1997 (1997), 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/sipp/disab97/asc97.html (last visited Sept. 10, 
2004).  
 2. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328, 
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).  
 4. Id. § 12101(b)(1).  
 5. Id. § 12101(b)(2) (emphasis added).  
 6. The ADA addresses private employers at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. 
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ADA, a complaining employee must prove that his employer dis-
criminated against him “because of” his disability in order to win a 
claim.7 The importance of these two simple words—“because of”—
may not be apparent at first glance, but the courts’ failure to inter-
pret them uniformly has left a critical issue with major implications 
unresolved: the standard of causation under the ADA.  
 Currently, some circuits take the position that Title I of the ADA 
imposes liability upon an employer only if an adverse employment 
action is taken “solely because of” a disability. Alternatively, other 
circuits find that Title I imposes liability where there are additional 
legitimate reasons for the adverse employment action, and the dis-
ability was only a motivating factor.8 While a majority of the circuits 
have adopted the motivating-factor standard, a few circuits still ap-
ply the “solely” standard of liability.9 An inconsistent causation stan-
dard under the ADA is significant for both employers and employees, 
especially from a policy perspective.10 For example, if a “solely” stan-
dard of causation is adopted, the disabled employee faces the nearly 
insurmountable task of proving that an employer’s adverse employ-
ment action was strictly based on the employee’s disability alone.11 
Along the same lines, the “solely” standard gives employers much 
more discretion in their decisionmaking with regard to disabled ap-
plicants or employees. Providing employers with such freedom in 
their employment decisions regarding disabled employees is counter-
intuitive to the main purpose of the ADA, which is to eliminate dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities.12  
 In the alternative, critics claim that if courts adopt a motivating-
factor standard, the burden an employee must overcome to win a 
claim for disability discrimination is, arguably, much lower. There-
fore, the employer will have to use greater caution, or will simply 
have its hands tied in deciding whether to take an adverse employ-
ment action against a disabled employee.13 Likewise, these critics 
                                                                                                                    
 7. Id. § 12112(a).  
 8. This standard is also known as a “mixed-motive” standard. For background in-
formation on the current status of the mixed-motive standard, see Jeffrey A. Van Detta, 
“Le Roi Est Mort; Viva Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and 
the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-
Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003). 
 9. See infra Part II.  
 10. See Natalie Palmer Jones Storch, Comment, The Standard of Employer Liability 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 931, 956 (1998) (ar-
guing that a “solely” standard is correct); John L. Flynn, Note, Mixed-Motive Causation 
Under the ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2009, 2010 (1995) (concluding that a “solely” standard should be adopted).  
 11. See Storch, supra note 10, at 956.  
 12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 
1074 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that a “solely” standard would do little to end discrimina-
tion, but instead would  indulge it).   
 13. See Storch, supra note 10, at 956. 
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claim that creating a plaintiff-friendly burden would promote an on-
slaught of frivolous lawsuits, which would, in turn, place a heavy fi-
nancial burden on employers.14  
 Although these arguments make sense in theory, they are criti-
cally flawed for a couple of compelling reasons. First, contrary to 
popular belief, “[employers] prevail in more than ninety-three per-
cent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on 
the merits at the trial court level.”15 Second, the ADA plaintiff al-
ready shoulders a heavy burden to make out the prima facie ele-
ments of disability employment discrimination as required under the 
ADA, on which the courts have consistently taken a pro-employer 
stance.16 Adopting a “solely” standard of liability, therefore, would 
place another significant roadblock in front of a group of already dis-
advantaged plaintiffs.17  
 Other than the aforementioned policy arguments, this Comment 
adopts the, supposedly, more “plaintiff-friendly”18 motivating-factor 
standard of liability under Title I of the ADA. Thus, this Comment 
rejects the “solely” standard for a number of other concrete reasons: 
the plain language of the ADA reads “because of,” not “solely because 
of”;19 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 simply established a floor,20 and 
                                                                                                                    
 14. See id. at 956-57.  
 15. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (footnotes omitted). Professor Colker’s data comes 
from a study of all employment discrimination cases available on Westlaw from 1992, the 
ADA’s effective date, to July 1998. Id. at 103. For further discussion regarding Professor 
Colker’s studies, see infra Part IV. See also Most Federal Appeals Court Decisions Favor 
ADA Defendants, Analysis Shows, DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULL., Nov. 20, 1997, at 1, 8-9; 
Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Mental & Physical Disability Law, Study Finds Employers Win 
Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998).  
 16. In order for a plaintiff to be protected under the ADA, an individual: (1) must 
have a disability; (2) must be a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) must have 
been discriminated against by his employer because of the disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 
12112.  
 17. In explaining the heavy burden on ADA plaintiffs, Professor Ruth Colker stated: 
These [employer-favored] results at the trial and appellate levels are very trou-
bling because they appear to run counter to Congress’ intent in passing the 
ADA. When Congress passed the statute, it stated in the findings and purpose 
section that it sought to eliminate discrimination for the 43 million Americans 
with disabilities. Its recitation of the 43 million figure suggests that it did not 
intend the courts to consider acts of discrimination to be rare, isolated events. 
It intended the courts to use realistic burdens of proof to reflect Congress’ belief 
that discrimination was widespread and needed to be swiftly redressed. Creat-
ing unduly high burdens of proof does not help redress the “serious and perva-
sive social problem” that Congress hoped to solve by enacting the ADA. 
Colker, supra note 15, at 126 (footnotes omitted).   
 18. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1996).  
 19. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (2000).  
 20. See Ruth Colker, The Death of Section 504, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 220 
(2002). Professor Colker states that Congress meant for section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act to act as a “floor” in determining the meaning of the ADA. Professor Colker also men-
260  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:257 
 
  
not a ceiling, for the level of protection given to disabled individuals 
in the workplace; the legislative history of the ADA overwhelmingly 
supports a motivating-factor standard;21 and finally, the ADA is mod-
eled after, and has been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Ti-
tle VII, which explicitly invokes a motivating-factor standard of li-
ability.22 
 Part II of this Comment examines the current circuit split in 
greater detail. Part III presents the arguments for adopting a moti-
vating-factor standard of liability (and rejecting the “solely” stan-
dard) across the board. Part IV examines policy justifications that 
support a motivating-factor standard. Lastly, Part V provides a brief 
conclusion. 
II.   THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 The federal circuits have yet to adopt a uniform standard of cau-
sation for employment discrimination cases under the ADA.23 A ma-
jority of the circuits, though, have adopted the motivating-factor 
standard of liability; these circuits comprise the First,24 Second,25 
Fourth,26 Seventh,27 Eighth,28 and Eleventh.29 Alternatively, circuits 
that currently utilize the minority view—the “solely” standard—are 
the Third,30 Fifth,31 Sixth,32 Ninth,33 and Tenth34. The common trend 
                                                                                                                    
tions that the passage of the ADA had a rather unexpected consequence: it narrowed the 
rights that were existent under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id.; see also infra Part 
III.A.  
 21. See infra Part III.B.  
 22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 
(2003), the Supreme Court interpreted this section to mean that direct evidence of dis-
crimination is not required in order to prove discrimination in mixed-motive cases under 
Title VII. Therefore, there is no heightened burden on a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case. 
Id. at 101-02. For further discussion comparing the similarities between the ADA and Title 
VII, see infra Part III.C. 
 23. Some of the cases discussed in this Part involve claims brought under Title II of 
the ADA, which covers the public sector. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. These cases are 
relevant because courts tend to treat the causation standards for Title I and II claims simi-
larly. Title II contains nearly identical causation language: “no qualified individual shall . . 
. by reason of such disability, be . . . subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. § 
12132 (emphasis added).  
 24. See Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996).  
 25. See Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000), rev’d on other 
grounds, 260 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2001).  
 26. See Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999).  
 27. See Foster v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 28. See Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995).  
 29. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1996).  
 30. See McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 31. Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Center’s, Inc., 173 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 32. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).  
 33. See Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1999); Zukle v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 34. See White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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among the circuits that continue to employ the “solely” standard is to 
argue that, because the ADA contains much of the same language as 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which imposes a “solely because of” 
standard, the ADA should require the same. Part III of this Com-
ment, however, explains in greater detail why this view is flawed—a 
position that a majority of the circuits have already accepted.   
A.   Circuits That Apply the “Solely” Standard 
 Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit continues to use a “solely” stan-
dard of liability for ADA claims. In Zukle v. Regents of the University 
of California,35 Sherrie Lynn Zukle, a learning-disabled medical 
school student, brought claims under both the Rehabilitation Act and 
Title II of the ADA after the school dismissed her for failing to meet 
the school’s academic standards.36 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the University of California on the grounds that, 
because Zukle could not meet the minimum standards of the Univer-
sity with reasonable accommodation, she was not a qualified individ-
ual under either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.37  
 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on the 
grounds that the student’s requested accommodations were not rea-
sonable; thus the court did not have to rule on the proper standard of 
causation under the ADA.38 The Ninth Circuit, however, did state 
that Ms. Zukle would need to demonstrate that “she was dismissed 
solely because of her disability” under either the ADA or the Reha-
bilitation Act.39 The court justified establishing the same standard of 
liability under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by explain-
ing that “[b]ecause the language of the two statutes is substantially 
the same,” they should be “interpreted consistently.”40  
 In similar fashion, the Sixth Circuit, in Sandison v. Michigan 
High School Athletic Ass’n,41 also held that Title II of the ADA re-
                                                                                                                    
 35. 166 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 36. Id. at 1042-43, 1045.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1051.  
 39. Id. at 1045 (emphasis added).  
 40. Id. at 1045 n.11.  
 41. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 
1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that in order to “recover on a claim of discrimination 
under the [ADA], a plaintiff must show that: 1) he is an individual with a disability; 2) he 
is ‘otherwise qualified’ to perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation; and 3) he was discharged solely by reason of his handicap”) (emphasis 
added); Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995) (asserting that the 
analysis under the ADA roughly parallels that under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The 
Sixth Circuit, in a later slip opinion, acknowledged that a majority of the other circuits 
have adopted the motivating-factor standard. See Layman v. Alloway Stamping & Mach. 
Co., No. 01-6568, slip op. at 5 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2004). The court even hinted that the cau-
sation standard under the ADA would be an “interesting question for the en banc court.” 
Id.  
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quires that the discrimination occurred “solely by reason of [one’s 
disability].”42 In Sandison, a group of nineteen-year-old high school 
students with learning disabilities challenged one of the Michigan 
High School Athletic Association’s (MHSAA) regulations, which pro-
hibited nineteen-year-olds from participating in cross-country.43 The 
district court granted a preliminary injunction, and the Sixth Circuit 
held that the MHSAA policy did not violate either section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.44 
 In deciding the students’ ADA claims on the merits, the court 
stated: “a plaintiff proceeding under title II of the ADA must, similar 
to a section 504 plaintiff, prove that the exclusion from participation 
in the program was ‘solely by reason of [disability].’”45 Since the 
MHSAA’s regulation prohibited the students from participating be-
cause of their age, and not solely because of their disability, the court 
held in favor of the MHSAA.46 
 Neither the Tenth Circuit, in White v. York International Corp.,47 
nor the Third Circuit, in McDonald v. Pennsylvania,48 required the 
courts to define the proper standard of liability under the ADA, but 
both claimed in dicta that the “solely” standard was proper. In White, 
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the employer because the disabled employee failed to 
establish that he was a qualified individual with a disability for pur-
poses of the ADA.49 The court did, however, state that because the 
plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability, the court did 
not need to consider whether the employer “terminated him solely 
because of his disability.”50  
 The Third Circuit, in McDonald, was more cryptic in asserting the 
standard of liability under the ADA.51 Again, the court did not need 
to define a standard of liability because the court upheld the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer because the em-
ployee failed to prove that she was an “otherwise-qualified” individ-
ual with a disability.52 The opinion does not mention the word 
“solely,” especially regarding a standard of liability, but it does men-
                                                                                                                    
 42. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1036.  
 43. Id. at 1028-29.  
 44. Id. at 1037.  
 45. Id. at 1036 (alteration in original). The Sixth Circuit has continued to use the 
“solely” standard. In Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 2003), the court 
stated that an ADA plaintiff must demonstrate that she is “being subjected to discrimina-
tion under the program solely because of her disability.”  
 46. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1036.  
 47. 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 48. 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 49. 45 F.3d at 363. 
 50. Id. (emphasis added). 
 51. 62 F.3d at 97.  
 52. Id. 
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tion that the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA should impose the 
same “substantive standards for determining liability.”53 
 The common analysis among every circuit that has either adopted 
or shown support for the “solely” standard of causation is that the 
ADA imposes similar, if not identical, substantive standards of liabil-
ity as those under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  
B.   Circuits That Apply the “Motivating-Factor” Standard 
 While the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits continue 
to employ a “solely” standard of liability under the ADA,54 the rest of 
the circuits, which make up a majority, have finally recognized that: 
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are not only different causes of 
action but have different causation standards. These circuits have 
decided to adopt a motivating-factor standard of liability under the 
ADA for a variety of reasons. These reasons, along with others sup-
porting the motivating-factor standard, are analyzed in greater detail 
in Part III.  
 The Eleventh Circuit initiated the shift away from the “solely” 
standard with its influential decision in McNely v. Ocala Star-
Banner Corp.,55 in which it became the first circuit to give in-depth 
justifications for adopting the motivating-factor standard. Until 
McNely, the rest of the circuits had taken the view that the ADA and 
the Rehabilitation Act required the same substantive standards. The 
McNely court distinguished these two similar statutes by analyzing 
the differences in statutory language, reviewing the legislative his-
tory, observing the similarities in causal language between the ADA 
and Title VII, and, lastly, finding a lack of clear support for the 
“solely” standard in the other circuits.56 
 Among the reasons the court gave for declining to follow the 
“solely” standard was the plain language of the ADA, which states: 
“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual 
with a disability because of the disability of such individual.”57 The 
court also found support for adopting the plain-language interpreta-
tion of the ADA’s causation language from the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.58 In Price Waterhouse, the Su-
preme Court found that “because of,” as used in Title VII, did not 
                                                                                                                    
 53. Id. at 94-95.  
 54. See supra Part II.A.  
 55. 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1996). Although McNely was the first decision to give a de-
tailed explanation supporting a motivating-factor (“but-for”) standard, the Eighth Circuit, 
in Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transportation, Inc., 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995), was the first to re-
ject the “solely” standard. Strangely enough, the Eleventh Circuit does not cite this opinion 
in McNely. See McNely, 99 F.3d 1068.  
 56. McNely, 99 F.3d at 1073-78. 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (emphasis added); McNely, 99 F.3d at 1073-75.  
 58. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  
264  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:257 
 
  
mean “solely because of.”59 In addition, the McNely court reasoned 
that using the restrictive term “solely” from the Rehabilitation Act 
cannot be reconciled with the main purpose of the ADA: “the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”60  
 Next, the court looked to the legislative history of the ADA and 
concluded that it provided additional support for rejecting the 
“solely” standard.61 The court focused on the House Committee Re-
ports that explain why “solely” was left out of Title II’s language. The 
Committee’s reason for not imposing a “solely” standard was that it 
would lead to “absurd results.”62 For example, with a “solely” stan-
dard, a disabled black employee would never be able to have a suc-
cessful claim under the ADA because the employer would simply 
need to demonstrate that the adverse employment action was taken 
“because of” the employee’s race, not his disability.63 The report does 
mention that the employee could have a claim of race discrimination 
under Title VII, but rejects that this was the intended result of the 
“solely” language.64 Although Mr. McNely, the plaintiff, brought his 
claim under Title I of the ADA, the court concluded that there was no 
reason to believe that the Committee’s reasoning should be limited to 
Title II claims, especially since Titles I and II contain substantially 
identical language.65 
 Furthermore, the court found that every circuit, except for the 
Seventh, had not adopted a “solely” standard because the other cir-
cuits merely supported it in dicta. The McNely court did observe, 
however, that the Seventh Circuit, in Despears v. Milwaukee 
County,66 was the only circuit to truly hold that a “solely” standard 
was correct.67 While the McNely court did acknowledge the Seventh 
Circuit’s stance on the matter, the court declined to agree with the 
Seventh Circuit.68 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit declared that 
the Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted its holding in Despears, stating: 
Such a reading of Despears puts it at odds with a host of decisions 
holding that the ADA prohibits employment discrimination if a 
covered disability is one motivating factor, even if not necessarily 
the sole cause, of the adverse employment action. But these cases 
misread Despears, which holds only that the plaintiff’s alcoholism 
                                                                                                                    
 59. Id. at 241.  
 60. McNely, 99 F.3d at 1074 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).  
 61. See id. at 1074-75. 
 62. Id. at 1075.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.   
 66. 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 67. See McNely, 99 F.3d at 1077. 
 68. See id.   
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was a partial cause of his drunk driving incident, but that his 
drunk driving incident was the sole cause of his demotion.69 
After determining the “solely” standard was incorrect under the 
ADA, the McNely court found that the district court’s jury instruc-
tion,70 which stated that liability could be imposed only if Star-
Banner had terminated McNely solely because of his disability, was 
improper because it did not accurately reflect the law.71 The case was 
then remanded with the instruction to use a motivating-factor stan-
dard of liability.72  
 A few years later, the Fourth Circuit, in Baird v. Rose,73 fully ac-
cepted the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to adopt a motivating-factor-
standard of liability under the ADA. In doing so, the court rejected 
its prior decision in Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System 
Corp.,74 in which it imposed the “solely because of” standard of liabil-
ity for claims under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. In ad-
dition to relying on McNely to reject the “solely” standard, the court 
reasoned that since the plain language of the ADA is similar to that 
of Title VII, there should be a consistent standard of causation—a 
motivating-factor standard.75 
 Furthermore, in Parker v. Columbia Pictures Industries,76 the 
Second Circuit adopted the motivating-factor standard of liability. 
The court noted that other circuits, including the Fourth and Elev-
enth, had held that a motivating-factor-standard analysis available 
in a Title VII context also applied to claims brought under the ADA.77 
Moreover, the court noted that Congress must have meant to cover 
more extensive ground with the ADA than the Rehabilitation Act be-
cause it eliminated the word “solely” from the causation provision of 
the ADA.78 The court, therefore, concluded that the ADA imposes li-
ability upon employers where discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity is one factor, but not the only factor, behind an adverse employ-
ment action.79  
                                                                                                                    
 69. Pernice v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 783, 786 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Despears, 
63 F.3d at 636-37).  
 70. The jury instruction stated, in part: “Do you find, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that Plaintiff has proved that he was terminated solely because of his alleged dis-
ability?” McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 (emphasis added).  
 71. See id. at 1078. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999).  
 74. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).  
 75. Baird, 192 F.3d at 470.  
 76. 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000).  
 77. Id. at 336. 
 78. Id. at 337. 
 79. Id. 
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 Likewise, in Foster v. Arthur Anderson, LLP,80 the Seventh Circuit 
adopted the motivating-factor standard under the ADA. Although the 
court upheld summary judgment for the employer because the plain-
tiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination,81 
the court stated that an employer violates the ADA if the disability 
was “a motivating factor” although it “need not be the employer’s 
only reason for termination.”82 In coming to this conclusion, the court 
compared the similarities in language between the ADA and Title 
VII.83 Additionally, the court distinguished the language of Title VII 
from that of the Rehabilitation Act.84  
 The rest of the circuits, including the First and Eighth, have sup-
ported the motivating-factor standard of liability under the ADA for 
similar reasons.85 In sum, a majority of the circuits have rejected the 
“solely” standard of liability.  
III.   REASONS FOR ADOPTING A “MOTIVATING-FACTOR” STANDARD 
A.   Separate Statutes: The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act 
 The primary reason a minority of circuits have refused to adopt a 
motivating-factor standard of liability is the belief that the ADA and 
the Rehabilitation Act impose the same substantive requirements. It 
is true that these two federal statutes are similar in many ways.86 In 
fact, the ADA even provides that it should be interpreted consistently 
with the Rehabilitation Act.87 This Comment, however, argues that 
the Rehabilitation Act imposes a higher causation standard than the 
ADA for two distinct reasons: (1) the ADA’s plain language relating 
to causation is inconsistent with that of section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act; and (2) the preexisting rights provided under section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act were meant to serve as a “floor,” not a ceiling, 
for rights provided to disabled individuals. 
 The Supreme Court has declared that “[w]hen . . . the terms of a 
statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except ‘in 
rare and exceptional circumstances.’”88 Title I of the ADA, which ap-
plies to the private sector, is unambiguous. Title I provides: 
                                                                                                                    
 80. 168 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 81. Id. at 1033. 
 82. Id.   
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1033 n.7. 
 85. Colker, supra note 15, at 119.  
 86. See Storch, supra note 10, at 953-54; Brief for Petitioner at 9, McNely v. Ocala 
Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1318).  
 87. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (2000).  
 88. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 187 n.33 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court also stated 
that “[w]e must give effect to this plain language unless there is good reason to believe 
Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning.” Shaw v. Delta 
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No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual 
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in re-
gard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.89 
Also unambiguous is the fact that this language does not include the 
word “solely,” unlike section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which, in 
pertinent part, states: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United 
States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be ex-
cluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal 
Service.90 
 Some scholars argue that since Congress relied heavily upon the 
language of the Rehabilitation Act in drafting the ADA, the same 
substantive requirements should apply.91 As previously discussed, a 
minority of circuits have taken the same approach in requiring the 
“solely” standard of liability under both statutes.92 In fact, the ADA 
does state that complaints under both the ADA and the Rehabilita-
tion Act should be addressed “in a manner that avoids duplication of 
effort and prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting stan-
dards for the same requirements.”93 Preceding this part, however, the 
same section of the ADA provides that “[t]he agencies with enforce-
ment authority for actions which allege employment discrimination 
under this subchapter and under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . 
shall develop procedures . . . that avoid[] duplication of effort.”94 It is, 
                                                                                                                    
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). For a textualist perspective on the differences in 
language between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, see Flynn, supra note 10, at 2023-
38. John Flynn, in arguing for a “solely” standard, asserts that “textualism not only asserts 
that legislative history cannot trump plain meaning, it eschews the use of ubiquitous and 
ostensibly unreliable committee reports in any way. Instead, textualism focuses on plain 
meaning of specific terms and a more general structural analysis of the statute.” Id. at 
2025-26 (footnotes omitted). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, Title II, which applies to public 
sector employment, provides a nearly identical provision: 
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a dis-
ability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or 
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 
Id. § 12132(a) (emphasis added).  
 90. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (emphasis added).  
 91. See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 475-76 (1991) (stating that the interpretation of the 
ADA is consistently based on the Rehabilitation Act); Storch, supra note 10, at 953-56.  
 92. See supra Part II.A. 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b).  
 94. Id. (emphasis added). 
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therefore, reasonable to infer that Congress’s intent was that claims 
brought under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are merely sup-
posed to receive nonduplicative procedural treatment by the EEOC.  
 To further support this reasoning, § 12117(b) is entitled, “Coordi-
nation.”95 Meanwhile, the preceding section under the same heading, 
§ 12117(a), is entitled, “Powers, remedies, and procedures,” and 
states that the powers of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are pro-
vided to Title I claimants.96 This is significant because, as this Com-
ment later discusses in Part III.C, Title VII imposes liability when 
discrimination occurs “because of” race, religion, and the like, thus 
supporting a motivating-factor standard of liability.97  
 The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA do not need to be interpreted 
identically because the Rehabilitation Act merely acts as a “floor,” 
and not a ceiling, for the substantive rights provided under the 
ADA.98 The ADA, in 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a), states that “[e]xcept as oth-
erwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under 
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”99 If the ADA, therefore, does 
provide a more “plaintiff-friendly” standard of liability than the Re-
habilitation Act because it imposes liability upon an employer if it 
discriminated because of, instead of solely because of, a disability, 
then this standard of liability is perfectly consistent with the lan-
guage of the ADA.  
 The defendant in McNely argued that the ADA provides no 
greater protection to victims of discrimination than they receive un-
der the Rehabilitation Act, which requires a “solely because of” stan-
dard.100 This argument, however, is inconsistent with the language of 
the ADA in 42 U.S.C. § 12202(a) because the Rehabilitation Act 
merely sets a “floor,” not a ceiling, for the amount of substantive 
rights afforded to victims of disability discrimination.101 The Eleventh 
Circuit nevertheless entertained the defendant’s argument and still 
came to the conclusion that the “solely” standard was improper.102 
The court, however, in arriving at this decision, mistakenly relied 
upon the introductory portion of § 12201(a), which states, “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided in this chapter,” instead of using the floor-versus-
                                                                                                                    
 95. Id. 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).  
 97. See generally Van Detta, supra note 8.  
 98. See Colker, supra note 20, at 220 (stating that Congress intended section 504 to be 
the “floor” in determining the meaning of the ADA). Professor Colker, however, maintains 
that the result of the ADA has been the opposite of providing a floor for disability rights; 
“[i]nstead, the ADA has pulled the rug out from under Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation 
Act].” Id. at 228.  
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). 
 100.  McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 101. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).  
 102. McNely, 99 F.3d at 1074. 
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ceiling theory.103 Utilizing this language, the court held that since 
Congress used broader language in the ADA than in comparable pro-
visions of the Rehabilitation Act, the restrictive standards of the Re-
habilitation Act should not be imported into the ADA.104 Neverthe-
less, the court correctly concluded that the Rehabilitation Act does 
not set a ceiling of substantive rights for individuals subject to dis-
ability discrimination in the workplace.  
B.   Legislative History Favors a “Motivating-Factor” Standard 
 Further support for the premise that the ADA imposes a motivat-
ing-factor standard of liability is grounded in the ADA’s legislative 
history. Although the legislative history does not provide a smoking 
gun confirming a motivating-factor standard, it does, quite convinc-
ingly, point in the direction of adopting a motivating-factor standard. 
Specifically, the legislative history explains why Congress decided to 
leave the word “solely” out of Title II105 and how the ADA should be 
“interpreted in a manner consistent with . . . Title VII.”106  
 According to the House Committee Reports, Congress left the 
word “solely” out of the causation language in the liability provision 
of Title II of the ADA because “[a] literal reliance on the phrase 
‘solely by reason of his or her handicap’ leads to absurd results.”107 In 
order to illustrate this point, one report gave the following example: 
[A]ssume that an employee is black and has a disability and that 
he needs a reasonable accommodation that, if provided, will enable 
him to perform the job for which he is applying. He is a qualified 
applicant. Nevertheless, the employer rejects the applicant be-
cause he is black and because he has a disability. 
 In this case, the employer did not refuse to hire the individual 
solely on the basis of his disability—the employer refused to hire 
him because of his disability and because he was black. Although 
the applicant might have a claim of race discrimination under title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act, it could be argued that he would not 
have a claim under section 504 because the failure to hire was not 
based solely on his disability and as a result he would not be enti-
tled to a reasonable accommodation.108 
Congress, therefore, explicitly omitted this key term from the Reha-
bilitation Act and substituted it with different language in Title II of 
the ADA. An argument could be made that this legislative history is 
                                                                                                                    
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 85 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 368. 
 106. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696-
97. 
 107. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 85 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 368. 
 108. Id. 
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only applicable to prevent absurd results arising from discrimination 
claims brought under Title II of the ADA. It is unlikely, however, 
that Congress intended to prevent absurd results from Title II dis-
crimination claims but allow them to occur in Title I claims, espe-
cially when both Titles employ nearly identical causation language.109 
 Nevertheless, even if this piece of legislative history could be pi-
geonholed as only applying to discrimination claims under Title II of 
the ADA, a more recent piece of legislative history, which the 
McNely110 court did not have an opportunity to utilize, appears to ap-
ply to all forms of discrimination under the ADA, not just under Title 
II. In relevant part, this legislative history asserts that “[a] number 
of other laws banning discrimination, including the [ADA] and the 
[ADEA] are modeled after, and have been interpreted in a manner 
consistent with, Title VII.”111 Discussing how these acts, specifically 
the ADA and Title VII, should be interpreted similarly, the legisla-
tive history further instructs that “mixed motive cases involving dis-
ability under the ADA should be interpreted consistent with the pro-
hibition against all intentional discrimination in Section 5 of this 
Act.”112 The language in section 5 asserts that “an unlawful employ-
ment practice is established when a complaining party demonstrates 
that [any protected trait under Title VII] was a contributing factor 
[and not the only reason] for an employment practice . . . .”113 These 
statements from the committee report forcefully point toward adopt-
ing a motivating-factor standard of causation for discrimination 
claims under the ADA, regardless of which ADA title the claim is 
brought under.114  
C.   The ADA’s Similarities with Title VII 
 The final reason that a motivating-factor standard of causation 
should be adopted under the ADA is the similarity of its causation 
                                                                                                                    
 109. See McNely, 99 F.3d at 1075. The causation language under Title I of the ADA 
states, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (emphasis added). Title II of the 
ADA provides, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability 
. . . be subjected to discrimination.” Id. § 12132 (emphasis added).  
 110. 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1996).   
 111. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 649, 696-97 
(citations omitted).  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 16-17.  
 114. While the committee report is strong support for adopting a motivating-factor 
standard of causation under the ADA, the argument could be made that “Congress could 
have made clear any intention to apply the motivating-factor amendment to the ADA sim-
ply by inserting the word ‘disability’ in § 2000e-2(m) or adding a similar provision to the 
ADA.” Flynn, supra note 10, at 2046. In fact, one could argue that, using a textualist ap-
proach to statutory interpretation, the fact that Congress did not include the word “disabil-
ity” is instead dispositive that the committee language was not incorporated into the legis-
lation itself. Id. at 2048.    
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language to that in Title VII; in fact, both provide the exact same 
causal language—“because of.”115 Under Title VII, employers are pro-
hibited from discriminating “because of” any protected characteristic, 
including “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”116 In the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified the meaning of the “because of” 
standard of liability under Title VII by providing, “an unlawful em-
ployment practice is established when the complaining party demon-
strates that [a protected trait] was a motivating factor for any em-
ployment practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice.”117 Among these protected traits, however, the term “disability” 
is missing.118 Nevertheless, courts have not found this exclusion dis-
positive; for example, the Second Circuit, in Parker v. Columbia Pic-
tures Industries, held that: 
[N]othing in either the language or purpose of either statute sug-
gests that Congress intended different causation standards to ap-
ply to the different forms of discrimination. Rather, the “substan-
tially identical . . . causal language” used in Title VII and the ADA 
. . . indicates that the expansion of Title VII to cover mixed-motive 
cases should apply to the ADA as well. In light of the statutory 
language and purpose underlying the ADA, therefore, we join 
those circuits[119] that have held that, in establishing a prima fa-
cie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff need not demon-
strate that disability was the sole cause of the adverse employment 
action. Rather, he must show only that disability played a motivat-
ing role in the decision.120 
The Parker court relied on the virtually identical causation language 
in Title VII and the ADA, and the lack of language in either statute 
to clarify whether Congress desired different causation standards 
under each statute.121  
 It is, in fact, true that in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) of Title VII does 
not include “disability” as a protected trait,122 and nowhere in the 
ADA itself does it state that a motivating-factor standard of liability 
is proper. While there is a lack of a definitive statutory language that 
permits a motivating-factor standard, a more detailed examination of 
the ADA’s statutory language reveals that the ADA does, rather indi-
                                                                                                                    
 115. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Cf. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 
337 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a motivating-factor standard of liability is proper under 
the ADA because of the similarity in causation language with Title VII).  
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).  
 118. See id. 
 119. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996); Katz 
v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996); Buchanan v. City of San Antonio, 85 F.3d 
196, 200 (5th Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir. 1995).  
 120. 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 121. Id. 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).  
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rectly, reference the Title VII section that permits a motivating-
factor standard of liability. The ADA, in 42 U.S.C. § 12117, entitled 
“Enforcement,” incorporates all the “powers, remedies, and proce-
dures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 
2000e-9,” which are provisions of Title VII.123 Therefore, of the Title 
VII provisions that the ADA incorporates, the motivating-factor pro-
vision—§ 2000e-2(m)—is not one of them,124 but § 2000e-5—an incor-
porated provision—directly references § 2000e-2(m).125 Thus, the 
ADA does indeed reference § 2000e-2(m) by incorporating § 2000e-5, 
which, in turn, incorporates § 2000e-2(m).  
 A student-written comment noted that, while this argument has 
“substantive appeal,” it amounts to the ADA’s “impermissible boot-
strapping” of the motivating-factor provision of Title VII—42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(m)—because the motivating-factor standard is not a power, 
remedy, or procedure, but rather a “substantive standard of liabil-
ity.”126 Furthermore, the author proposed that even if the motivating-
factor standard of liability could be considered a “remedy,” it would 
still amount to impermissible bootstrapping because § 2000e-5, when 
amended in 1991, did not add to the list of previously available 
remedies; instead, this provision acted to limit the remedies previ-
ously available under Title VII.127   This proposition, however, is in-
correct because, as the author acknowledged, the amended § 2000e-
5(g) does not grant any additional remedies that were not available 
under the pre-amended Title VII.128 What the 1991 amendments to 
Title VII did was give the courts the ability to grant the previously 
available remedies to plaintiffs if they prove that an employer would 
have taken the same action without the presence of the impermissi-
ble motivating factor—in other words, a violation of the motivating-
factor amendment.129 Therefore, the remedies, per se, were neither 
expanded nor limited by the amendment, but the court’s ability to 
award these remedies was altered.  
 Given that the underlying argument is that the ADA incorporates 
the “powers, remedies, and procedures” of Title VII, the question be-
comes whether the ADA’s definition of “remedies” under § 12117 is 
referring to the actual remedies available or the court’s ability to 
grant the plaintiff these remedies.130 If the answer is the former, the 
                                                                                                                    
 123. Id.  § 12117 (emphasis added).  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. § 2000e-5.  
 126. Flynn, supra note 10, at 2042.  
 127. Id. at 2042-46. 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). 
 129. Id. § 2000e-2(m).  
 130. The damages are listed under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The section reads: 
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section [2002e-
2(m)] and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken 
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ADA may not indirectly incorporate Title VII’s motivating-factor 
statute—§ 2000e-2(m). But if it is the latter, there is no doubt that 
the ADA incorporates Title VII’s motivating-factor standard of liabil-
ity.  
 Although the question arguably remains unresolved as to whether 
the motivating-factor standard of liability is a “remedy” under Title 
VII, it is also feasible to pigeonhole it as a “power,”131 which would be 
another way the ADA incorporates the motivating-factor standard 
through § 12117. This section, in relevant part, states, “[t]he powers . 
. . [of Title VII132] shall be the powers . . . this subchapter provides to 
the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging 
discrimination on the basis of disability . . . .”133 Neither the ADA nor 
Title VII defines the meaning of “power.”  
 According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 
“power” is defined as the “ability to act or produce an effect.”134 Since 
42 U.S.C. § 12117 of the ADA states that this “power” is given to “any 
person alleging discrimination,” the argument is that an ADA plain-
tiff is empowered with the same powers as a Title VII plaintiff,135 who 
has the ability to produce certain remedies—the effect—by proving 
that a discriminatory reason played a motivating factor in the em-
ployer decision, regardless of whether the employer would have made 
the same decision anyway.136 And unlike the “remedies” argument, 
which would not justify the ADA’s adoption of the motivating-factor 
standard under Title VII if it refers to the court’s ability to grant the 
plaintiff the same pre-amendment remedies,137 the “powers” argu-
ment is not dependent on the actions of the court. Therefore, a plain-
tiff that alleges disability discrimination, regardless of the court’s 
propensity, has the power—or ability to produce—limited relief if he 
is able to prove that a discriminatory reason played a motivating fac-
tor in the employer’s decision.  
 Another persuasive reason to explain why a motivating-factor 
analysis is improper under both the ADA and Title VII merely be-
                                                                                                                    
the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the 
court—  
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause 
(ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only 
to the pursuit of a claim under section [2002e-2(m)] and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, rein-
statement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A). 
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 131. See id. § 12117(a).  
 132. The specific Title VII sections are codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 
2000e-8, and 2000e-9.  
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).  
 134. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1778 (1986).  
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).  
 136. Id. § 2000e-2(m).  
 137. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.  
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cause they have the same “because of” causation language has been 
provided by the Sixth Circuit.138 The court asserted that Title VII is 
subject to a motivating-factor analysis not on the basis of the “be-
cause of” language, but because Congress expressly modified the 
standard in the Civil Rights Amendment of 1991.139 To demonstrate 
this point, the court noted that since Congress amended Title VII by 
specifically including the term “motivating factor,” it did not mean 
that “because of” imposed a motivating-factor standard of liability 
prior to the adoption of the amendment.140 
 Although the Sixth Circuit’s logic is compelling, it is critically 
flawed for one main reason: Congress was merely codifying a stan-
dard that was in effect prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,141 but with an additional wrinkle. The House 
Judiciary Committee, in its committee report, made this clear when 
it noted that by establishing a “motivating factor”142 standard, it in-
tended to “restore the rule applied by the majority of the circuits prior 
to the Price Waterhouse decision that any discrimination that is ac-
tually shown to play a role in a contested employment decision may 
be the subject of liability.”143 In fact, the committee report indicated 
that the change being instituted was to ensure that the presence of a 
contributing discriminatory factor can still establish a Title VII viola-
tion, even if an employer can establish that it would have made the 
same adverse employment decision without considering the discrimi-
natory factor.144 Congress, therefore, was not creating a motivating-
                                                                                                                    
 138. See Layman v. Alloway Stamping & Mach. Co., 98 Fed. Appx. 369, 375 n.3 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (unpublished decision), available at 2004 WL 719262.  
 139. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994)).  
 140. Id. (stating that “[t]he modification of Title VII to adopt the ‘motivating factor’ 
standard suggests that the ‘because of’ language is not alone sufficient to trigger ‘mixed 
motives’ review”). 
 141. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  
 142. The committee report did not call it a “motivating factor” standard; instead, the 
report called it a “contributing factor” standard. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 18 (1991), 
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 711.  
 143. Id. (emphasis added).  
 144. In greater detail, the committee report stated: 
This provision would not make mere discriminatory thoughts actionable. 
Rather, to establish liability under the proposed Subsection 703(1), the com-
plaining party must demonstrate that discrimination was a contributing factor 
in the employment decision—i.e., that discrimination actually contributed to 
the employer’s decision with respect to the complaining party. 
Requiring that a Title VII violation is only established when discrimination is 
shown to be a contributing factor to an employment decision further clarifies 
that intent of this legislation to prohibit only an employer’s actual discrimina-
tory actions, rather than mere discriminatory thoughts . . . . 
. . . . [W]here two independent contributing factors, one discriminatory and the 
other nondiscriminatory, [are] present, the remedies available to the complain-
ing party will be limited where the employer establishes that it would have 
made the same adverse employment decision even absent the discriminatory 
contributing factor. Where the employer makes such a showing, the employee 
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factor standard of liability; it was only reenacting it, with a new ave-
nue for finding liability, after the Supreme Court strayed from the 
previous standard in Price Waterhouse.145 
IV.   A “MOTIVATING-FACTOR” STANDARD: “PLAINTIFF FRIENDLY”? 
 The basic policy argument disfavoring the adoption of a motivat-
ing-factor standard of liability under the ADA is that it would criti-
cally impede employers from making adverse employment decisions 
against disabled employees; and, logically, these adversely affected 
employees would have much more favorable claims against their em-
ployers.146 On the other hand, if a “solely” standard of causation is 
adopted, disabled employees would face the nearly insurmountable 
task of proving that an employer’s adverse employment action was 
strictly based on their disabilities alone.147 These arguments make 
sense on their face, but the effect of adopting a motivating-factor 
standard of liability may not have the drastic effect that employers 
fear. 
 In fact, according to a recent set of studies conducted by Professor 
Ruth Colker,148 the only type of cases in a comparable area of law 
that fare worse than disability discrimination cases are prisoner 
rights cases.149 The studies gave shocking statistics about the success 
rate of ADA plaintiffs who must prove that it is not a “lifelong buffet 
of perks, special breaks, and procedural protections” for people with 
borderline disabilities.150 For example, the first set of studies indi-
cated that “defendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of 
reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the mer-
its at the trial court level.”151 Because these numbers caused great 
controversy, Professor Colker came out with a later study, which 
considered factors such as the type of discrimination claims that 
were brought and the categories of disabilities.152 Even after looking 
                                                                                                                    
would be precluded from receiving court-ordered hiring, reinstatement, promo-
tion, or back pay. However, the presence of a contributing discriminatory factor 
would still establish a Title VII violation, and a court could order other appro-
priate relief, including injunctive or declaratory relief, compensatory and puni-
tive damages where appropriate, and attorney’s fees. 
Id. at 18-19.  
 145. See 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  
 146. See Storch, supra note 10, at 956.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Professor Colker is the Heck-Faust Memorial Chair in Constitutional Law at The 
Ohio State University College of Law.  
 149. See Colker, supra note 15, at 100.  
 150. Id. at 99 (quoting Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 25, 
1997, at 116).  
 151. Id. at 100 (footnotes omitted).  
 152. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001).   
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at the prior results through a “sharper lens,”153 the study indicated 
that nearly “87% of the [ADA] cases appealed and made available on 
Westlaw had resulted in dismissals or grants of summary judgment 
for [employers] at the trial court level.”154  
 The study also indicated that one of the reasons for the signifi-
cantly pro-defendant numbers was a result of the courts abusing the 
summary judgment standard by creating a higher threshold of proof 
for ADA plaintiffs.155 In a Title VII claim, all a plaintiff needs to do is 
come up with enough evidence—regardless of whether it is direct or 
circumstantial—for a court to find that his protected trait, typically 
an immutable characteristic such as race, played a motivating factor 
in the adverse employment action.156 However, an ADA claim re-
quires the plaintiff to prove numerous gateway matters before the 
causation issue is ever considered, such as: that he is disabled under 
the ADA;157 that he is a qualified individual with a disability;158 and 
that the employer can reasonably accommodate the employee with-
out incurring undue hardship.159 If these noncausation issues raise 
genuine issues of material fact, the jury, rather than the judge, 
should be deciding them.160 The study indicated, however, that judges 
are “routinely deciding fact-intensive [ADA] cases without sending 
them to the jury.”161  
 Another interesting aspect of this study was that included among 
the circuits guilty of deciding fact-intensive issues in ADA claims 
were the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh—all 
of which have adopted the motivating-factor standard.162 Thus, even 
among the circuits that have adopted a motivating-factor standard, it 
is unlikely to aid the high number of ADA plaintiffs that are unable 
to get past the gateway matters. However, the fact that it may not 
cause a significant impact in the success rate of ADA claims should 
not discount the importance of the causation issue because, quite 
frankly, an employee that has proven that he is disabled, qualified, 
and that his employer has failed to reasonably accommodate him 
without incurring an undue hardship, should be entitled to some 
form of remedy. But under a “solely” standard, a plaintiff would not 
be able to recover a dime if the employer did not make the adverse 
employment decision solely because of the plaintiff’s disability. If an 
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 155. See Colker, supra note 15, at 102.  
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employer can therefore come forward with any other reason for its 
actions, it is completely absolved from any liability. This is a harsh 
standard for ADA plaintiffs, especially for those who have claims 
that merit an analysis of the causation issue.  
 Finally, a “solely” standard of liability cannot be reconciled with 
the underlying purpose of the ADA—to “eliminat[e] . . . discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities.”163 Under this standard, an 
employer is absolved of all liability if it can show that it took an ad-
verse employment action against a qualified disabled employee for 
any reason—no matter how miniscule—other than the employee’s 
disability. As the McNely court rightly opined, “[a] liability standard 
that tolerates decisions that would not have been made in the ab-
sence of discrimination, but were nonetheless influenced by at least 
one other factor, does little to ‘eliminate’ discrimination; instead, it 
indulges it.”164 The circuits that currently apply the “solely” standard 
are essentially shielding employers that have a discriminatory mo-
tive against disabled employees. If a motivating-factor standard is 
adopted across the board, a discriminatory employer would not be 
protected, and as Professor Colker’s studies indicate, the number of 
frivolous ADA lawsuits is not likely to increase because the success 
rate of ADA claims remains low.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The ADA requires a motivating-factor standard of causation. The 
purposes of the ADA—“to provide a clear and comprehensive na-
tional mandate for the elimination of discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities”165 and “to provide clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities”166—cannot be accomplished through a “solely” stan-
dard of causation. If an employer has discriminatory intent when 
taking an adverse employment action against a qualified disabled 
employee, it should be penalized, and the employee should be able to 
recover damages. However, with a “solely” standard, an employer can 
use this favorable causation standard to defend itself from legitimate 
ADA claimants, who have suffered discrimination in the workplace.  
 There are a number of justifications for adopting a motivating-
factor standard of liability under the ADA:167 the plain language of 
the ADA reads “because of,” not “solely because of”;168 the Rehabilita-
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tion Act of 1973 simply established a floor,169 and not a ceiling, for the 
level of protection given to disabled individuals in the workplace; the 
legislative history of the ADA overwhelmingly supports a motivating-
factor standard;170 and, furthermore, the motivating-factor standard 
of liability should be adopted because the ADA is modeled after, and 
has been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title VII, which 
explicitly invokes a motivating-factor standard of liability.171  
 Contrary to popular belief, a motivating-factor standard is 
unlikely to increase the number of frivolous ADA lawsuits because of 
the qualifying hurdles that stand in the way of ADA claimants. 
Therefore, employers are not going to have to face the heavy admin-
istrative and financial burdens defending these lawsuits; further-
more, employers are still going to be given leeway in their employ-
ment actions so long as they are not discriminatory. Adopting a mo-
tivating-factor standard of liability is a vital step toward ending dis-
crimination against disabled employees in the workplace. 
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